Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors by Laryea, Samuel & Hughes, Will
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
No
t C
op
ye
dit
ed
1 
 
Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors 
 
Samuel Laryea
1
 and Will Hughes
2
                                                 
1
 Lecturer, School of Construction Management and Engineering, University of Reading, P.O. Box 
219, Reading, RG6 6AW, UK (corresponding author) 
2
 Professor of Construction Management and Economics, School of Construction Management and 
Engineering, University of Reading, P.O. Box 219, Reading, RG6 6AW, UK 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. Submitted February 4, 2009; accepted September 13, 2010; 
                      posted ahead of print September 15, 2010. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000293
Copyright 2010 by the American Society of Civil Engineers
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
No
t C
op
ye
dit
ed
2 
 
Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors 
 
Abstract 
Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in 
construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients 
negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature.  
Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading 
UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and 
significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed 
three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their 
extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents 
(13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). 
Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk 
apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be 
excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk 
apportionment affects a contractor‟s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic 
factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly 
through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives.  
The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not 
be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for 
those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids. 
 
Keywords: bidding, contractor, participant observation, risk apportionment, UK 
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Introduction 
Formal and analytical risk models that contractors can incorporate into the bidding 
process for the purpose of allocating risk contingencies have proliferated in recent 
years (for example, a fuzzy set model by Zeng et al., 2007; a fuzzy logic-based 
artificial neural network model by Liu and Ling, 2005; a fuzzy set model by Paek et 
al., 1993; a fuzzy set model by Tah et al., 1993; and an influence diagramming-based 
technique by Al-Bahar and Crandall, 1990).  However, several empirical studies of 
contractors have shown that they are rarely used in practice: seven contractors in UK 
studied by Tah et al. (1994); 30 in UK by Akintoye and MacLeod (1997); 12 in US by 
Smith and Bohn (1999); 84 in UK by Akintoye and Fitzgerald (2000); 38 in Hong 
Kong by Wong and Hui (2006); and 60 in Hong Kong by Chan and Au (2007).  As 
this paper will demonstrate, the relationship between risk and price in the process 
used by contractors to calculate their bids for construction work is not articulated 
sufficiently in the literature (summarized in Laryea and Hughes, 2008). 
Most analytical risk models proposed by academic researchers have sought to 
prescribe how risk should be included in a bidding price.  Howev r, the actual process 
of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not 
clearly illuminated in most of the literature.  As explained in a construction contracts 
textbook by Murdoch and Hughes (2008: 128), many contracts for construction work 
are created by the process of tender, which often involves some form of market 
competition that clients use to obtain the lowest price from contractors. 
The fact that the pricing of work occurs in the tender process means that first, a basic 
understanding is needed of the whole tender process used by contractors to arrive at a 
bidding price.  Second, a basic understanding is needed of how, and in what 
circumstances, that price is influenced by the apportionment of risk.  However, there 
is little empirical research on the whole process used by contractors to put together a 
bidding price (see Appendix 1). Without a precise understanding of how contractors 
price a bid and take account of risks in reality, it would be hard to conceptualize 
analytical models for approaching risk response in the way that it normally happens in 
practice. Clearly, risk assessment ought to have a serious influence on a contractor‟s 
pricing strategy, but other factors also affect price. 
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The price clients will be willing to pay for construction work depends not only on 
their available resources, but also on what other sellers (contractors) in the market are 
willing to offer the same product for (see the elemental micro-economic theory of the 
behaviour of individual competitive markets in Lipsey, 1979: 93). 
Thus, a bidding price may be dependent on the market or competitive environment in 
which it takes place.  Brook (2004) explains that bidding often involves two 
processes.  First, estimating, which is the stage is where the actual project costs are 
taken into account.  Clearly, this process may depend on the level of expertise in a 
contractor‟s estimating department.  Second, adjudication, which is the stage where 
the directors of a firm will take a commercial view on the estimated cost, in the 
context of the firm‟s particular circumstances, market conditions and risk.  Thus, 
management will ultimately try to pitch the bidding price between cost and value in 
order to win the work (see explained in Murdoch and Hughes, 2008: 138-9). 
The approach used by contractors to take account of risk in the whole process of 
trying to pitch their bidding price to respond to these factors is not always clearly 
explained in the literature (see Appendix 1).  However, several analytical approaches 
have been proposed to help contractors in dealing with risk when bidding.  Without 
sufficient understanding of how contractors actually price a bid and take account of 
risks in reality, it would be hard to conceptualize analytical models that align with 
what contractors actually do.  But quite understandably, as authors like Skitmore and 
Wilcock (1994: 142) acknowledged, it is hard to get contractors to participate in 
studies of such nature mainly because of the commercially sensitive data involved. 
Several studies of contractors have shown that contractors are often reluctant to take 
full account of the cost of risk in their bidding price. The main reason is to avoid 
inflating their price with risk allowances and become uncompetitive (see for example, 
an interview study of 12 US contractors by Smith and Bohn, 1999; and a 
questionnaire study of 400 US contractors by Mochtar and Arditi, 2001).  Thus, it is 
unsurprising that several studies have shown that most contractors rarely approach the 
incorporation of risk in their bid proposals according to the contingency allocation 
theory prescribed by most analytical models.  It also implies that there are probably 
other risk response mechanisms used by contractors themselves that can be learned 
and used to inform practical risk analysis techniques. 
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Background 
It is standard text-book knowledge that risk is part of business endeavors because of 
uncertainty (Flanagan and Norman, 1993; Fisher and Jordan, 1996). Portfolio theory 
and capital market theory stipulate that the total risk comprises two types of risk (see 
financial analysis and portfolio management textbook by Fisher and Jordan, 1996). 
First, systematic risk, which cannot be controlled, emanates from external factors such 
as Acts of God, natural disasters, market risk, interest-rate risk and purchasing power 
risk. Second, unsystematic risk, which can be controlled relates to organization-
specific factors such as business risk and financial risk. These forms of risk are also 
fundamental to the construction (internal and external risk) and the insurance (pure 
and speculative risk) industries (see, for example, a study on risk allocation in tenders 
by Tah et al., 1993; and a standard textbook on insurance by Dorfman, 2002).  
As shown in a financial analysis textbook by Fisher and Jordan (1996), one way of 
pricing a product to meet expected profit is to quantify risk and build a required rate 
of return that comprises a riskless rate plus compensation for individual risk factors.  
Based on several years‟ working experience, Connolly (2006) explained that risk has 
cost, which can sometimes be catastrophic.  However, it is not easy to predict or to 
price risk, as shown in a survey of the top 400 US contractors, which revealed that 
pricing is a complex and difficult task for entrepreneurs (Mochtar and Arditi, 2001). 
According to a conceptual study by Mulholland and Christian (1999) in which an 
analytical approach was proposed for risk assessment in construction schedules, 
construction projects are initiated in complex and dynamic environments resulting in 
circumstances of high uncertainty and risk, which are compounded by demanding 
time constraints.  Flanagan and Norman (1993) explained that every construction 
project is unique in its features and risk.  However, risk is not unique to the 
construction sector, as explained in textbook on subjective probability by Wright and 
Ayton (1994).  The definitive guidance on economic theory and the construction 
industry observed that it is more often the way a set of factors combine to affect 
construction work which makes the industry unique (Hillebrandt, 1985).  In a 
historical overview of the construction industry, Hughes and Hillebrandt (2003: 508-
510) showed that these factors relate to the economic, contractual, political and 
physical environments in which construction projects take place and they tend to 
affect the way construction work is described, awarded, and documented.  These 
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factors include: necessity to price product before production, competitive tendering, 
low fixed-capital requirements, preliminary expenses, delays to cash-inflows, 
tendency to operate with too low a working capital, seasonal effects, fluctuations and 
their effects, Government intervention, activity related to development, uncertain 
ground conditions, unpredictable weather, and no performance liability or long-term 
guarantees.  These factors are also explained in textbooks by Calvert et al. (1995) and 
Kwakye (1997) that also show that construction projects are mostly complex, have a 
long production cycle, and involve the input of many participants. 
Some aspects of the construction management literature, for example Baloi and Price 
(2003: 262) and Ahmed et al. (2002: 4), have argued that contractors are poor at 
managing risk, simply because the experiential-based mechanisms they are reported 
to use in approaching risk are not „systematic‟ in nature.  However, this assertion does 
not ring true, in the light of other descriptions of the construction sector.  A historical 
overview of the construction industry by Hughes and Hillebrandt (2003: 511) shows 
that since the early part of the 19
th
 century, contractors have responded to risks in 
construction industry using various means.  Most contractors resorted to speculative 
house building in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries to sustain labor force and business costs 
through the peaks and troughs of contracted work.  In modern times, there is a 
growing tendency for contractors to use their positive cash flows to invest in projects, 
rather than house building.  More recently, successful contractors are diversifying into 
businesses whose cycles counteract that of construction.  Nowadays, contractors are 
mitigating risk by declining work perceived as too risky, subcontracting large portions 
of their work to others, and apportioning risk in wage structures.  In essence, they are 
passing risk on to others in the supply chain.  So, they seem adept at managing risk.  
However, by its very nature, risk is difficult to mitigate fully, and this applies to all 
business sectors, not just construction. 
Construction practitioners are often trained to take account of risk in projects, 
particularly, for example, in the compilation of a risk register, as outlined by the 
Project Management Institute (2004: 237-268).  This demonstrates that the 
importance of risk analysis is understood by practitioners.  However, a detailed 
understanding of how contractors get from this understanding of risk to a price is not 
typically explained in the literature. 
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The construction management literature articulates experience and intuition as the 
main mechanisms that contractors use for pricing risks.  For example, a survey of 400 
US contractors by Mochtar and Arditi (2001) showed that: 
“In setting their bid offer, most contractors rely on their intuition after subjectively assessing 
the competition; most contractors do not use special pricing software”. 
However, most analytical approaches appear to argue that experience and intuition do 
not form an adequate professional and objective basis for serious project management 
decisions (for example, Al-Bahar and Crandall, 1990). More than 60 „systematic‟ and 
„rational‟ approaches have been proposed as logical substitutes for the traditional, 
intuitive, unsystematic approach used by most contractors when it comes to dealing 
with risk (see Laryea and Hughes, 2008).  However, in most of the studies reviewed, 
no reference is made to any comprehensive empirical work that explains how 
contractors actually take account of risk in the whole tender process. 
Several authors, for example Kangari and Riggs (1989); Paek et al. (1993); Tah et al. 
(1993); and Liu and Ling (2005), have also proposed analytical models that 
contractors can use to assess risk in the bidding process. Citing the lack of significant 
work in construction risk analysis by fuzzy sets, Kangari and Riggs (1989) proposed a 
fuzzy set risk assessment methodology that can give contractors "…a more rational 
basis on which to make decisions".  The authors showe  how a risk value, calculated 
using fuzzy set principles, may be included as a risk premium in bids.  However, no 
reference is made to any empirical research on what contractors actually do. 
Using the same fuzzy set theory, Paek et al. (1993) proposed a risk-pricing method 
that contractors can use for analyzing and pricing risk when "…faced with the 
problem of deciding the bidding price of a construction project when the likelihood of 
the occurrence of risk events and the risk associated consequences are uncertain".  
The model prescribed how an optimum risk premium should be included in 
construction bids.  Here too, no reference is made to any empirical research on what 
contractors actually do. 
Tah et al. (1993) developed a conceptual model for “contractor‟s risk assessment 
during tender preparation for the purpose of allocating contingencies to cover the 
risks” using the principles of fuzzy set theory. Liu and Ling (2005) introduced a fuzzy 
logic-based artificial neural network model to help contractors in the “...estimation of 
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markup in a changeable and uncertain construction environment”. In justifying the 
model development, Liu and Ling argued that: 
“…it is important to be able to model markup estimation as the model can act as a decision aid 
to help contractors to overcome their shortcomings in judgment and limited short-term 
memory, which prevents them from processing large amounts of information”. 
However, the study cites no evidence to show that contractors do indeed have 
shortcomings in their judgment and a limited short-term memory, for which reason 
they require a sophisticated model to help in markup estimation. 
This paper argues that the mechanisms used by contractors to price risks in the 
bidding process should inform practical risk analysis techniques. The way that 
contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not well 
explained in most of the literature.  Several experiential-based textbooks and materials 
on estimating and bidding were identified for example, Brook (2004); Buchan et al. 
(2003); Hinze (1993); Harrison (1991); Skitmore (1989); Smith (1986); Geddes 
(1985); Wood (1982); Enterkin and Reynolds (1978); Wainwright and Wood (1977); 
Hall (1972); and Willis (1929).  However, just a few empirical studies on what 
contractors actually do were identified (see Appendix 1) and these did not seem to 
articulate sufficiently what contractors actually do in the whole bidding process. 
In practice, contractors clearly take account of risks when calculating their bids for 
construction work. Therefore, analytical risk models could be useful.  However, there 
is no comprehensive study which explains the whole bidding process of contractors, 
and particularly how risk is taken into account in the process. Without a precise 
understanding of what contractors actually do when they calculate their bids for 
construction work, it would be hard to prescribe improvements; it would be hard for 
the industry to improve on its bidding practices; and it would remain questionable the 
basis of bidding processes taught in construction schools. 
Therefore, the following questions should be addressed: 
 What basic activities are involved in bid calculation and to what extent? 
 What basic stages and roles are involved in the bidding process? 
 How is risk taken into account in the calculation of construction bids? 
 To what extent is the bid calculation process systematic in nature? 
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Without empirical work explaining what actually happens in practice, which would 
inform or justify the development of a new approach, the vicious circle seems set to 
continue. Clearly, our ability to prescribe improvements (such as analytical models) 
hinges on our ability to describe reality precisely. With the current empirical 
understanding of what contractors actually do in the whole bidding process, we can 
safely prescribe very little. Our purpose here is to carry out a comprehensive, 
inductive and intensive study (see Mintzberg, 1973: 230-231) that captures the whole 
bidding process and describes particularly the way that contractors take risk into 
account when pricing work, thus providing a basis for comparing theoretical risk 
analysis models with the actual practice of risk analysis.  The understanding will help 
to inform future developments to support contractors in their pricing of work. 
Specific objectives 
To this end, the specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To review analytical approaches proposed by academic researchers for 
contractor‟s risk analysis (i.e. theory); 
2. To ascertain how contractors actually take account of risk in the bidding process 
(i.e. practice); and 
3. To compare theory with practice to show how the findings can inform future 
developments to support contractors in their pricing of work. 
General research approach 
To achieve the research objectives, three things were necessary.  First, identifying and 
examining analytical approaches proposed in the literature for contractor‟s risk 
analysis.  This required a comprehensive method for capturing the analytical models, 
and learning about their propositions and underlying assumptions. Second, 
ascertaining what contractors actually do about risks in the whole bid-pricing process.  
This required a comprehensive method for capturing pricing activities, observing 
what contractors do when they put together a price, and learning about what features 
they take account of, including the extent to which they apportion risk and the 
mechanisms that they use for building up their contingencies. Third, comparing 
results from objectives one and two in order to identify potential areas of significant 
difference, and make recommendations that will inform future developments. 
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Objective #1: Review of analytical risk models 
The research method for achieving the first objective comprised of an examination of 
construction management journals, each from their first issue to articles in press (as at 
May 2008). The purpose was first to take account of all papers on risk that were 
published in them; and second, to log papers containing proposals for contractor‟s risk 
analysis at the tender stage.  This helped to learn about the underlying assumptions of 
the analytical propositions. A paper by Chau (1997) on “The ranking of construction 
management journals” provided a basic idea of journals in the field. The remaining 
papers were identified through a rigorous internet search which was followed by 
another search through a snowballing approach, namely references in papers 
identified earlier.  A comprehensive table of the risk models identified can be found in 
Laryea and Hughes (2008). Altogether, 67 analytical approaches for contractor‟s risk 
analysis were identified (starting from a probabilistic model by Gates, 1971 for 
quantifying contingencies for bidding mistakes; uncertainties; and variations in 
monetary terms) and the frequency of publication proved to be increasing: five (5) in 
1970s; 11 in 1980s; 24 in 1990s; and 25 in 2000s (so far). 
Analytical risk models may be useful.  However, several studies of contractors 
provide evidence and reasons why contractors rarely use the analytical risk models 
that have proliferated in the literature.  In separate research studies involving more 
than 30 contractors each, Akintoye and MacLeod (1997) and Ahmed et al. (2002) 
identified eight problems contractors face when confronted with project risk analysis 
models.  Smith and Bohn (1999) criticized risk models for their complexity of 
analysis and other shortcomings. Their interviews with 12 US contractors showed that 
contractors often consider market competition as an overriding concern when pricing 
work, but most analytical risk models hardly address this. 
Most of the 60+ analytical risk models for contractors examined and classified in 
(authors, 2008) were hardly derived from the kind of information commonly used in 
practice, apparently.  First, they were found to be mainly analytically-derived models.  
They are based essentially on the mathematical modeling ability of the authors rather 
than the exigencies of actual bidding practice.  Not to mention the sophistication 
involved, the propositions hardly incorporate the reality that market premium may, in 
fact, wipe risk premium (see Smith and Bohn, 1999: 106) especially as estimators 
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deal with costs whereas Directors deal with premiums.  Thus, most analytical risk 
models did not seem sensitive to the commercial exigencies of bidding practice.  
Second, most analytical models prescribe a three-step process for approaching risk in 
the bidding process namely: risk identification; risk assessment (i.e. risk analysis and 
evaluation); and risk response (i.e. contingency allocation).  The classical proposition 
in most analytical approaches for example, Tah et al. (1993) and Paek et al. (1993) is 
that based on the evaluated risk value of a project, a risk premium should be included 
in the bid price to cover risks.  However, contractors studied by Smith and Bohn 
(1999) indicated that in reality they try to avoid inflating their bid prices with risk 
allowances in order to beat competition and win work.  In fact, an ethnog aphic study 
of seven tendered projects by Rooke et al. (2004: 658-9) showed that contractors 
strategize to win the work first and then use mechanisms like claims to recover the 
cost of risk.  Thus, contractors may be adept at dealing with risk, although authors like 
Al-Bahar and Crandall (1990), Tah and Carr (2000) and Zeng et al. (2007) assume 
that the intuitive and experiential-based approach used by most contractors when 
dealing with risk does not form an adequate professional and objective basis for 
serious project management decisions. Third, no comprehensive study was found in 
the literature that captures the whole bidding process of contractors; describes how 
risk is taken into account throughout the process; and shows that pricing is indeed 
systematic in nature.  To this nd, systematic models proposed to help contractors in 
their pricing of work and risk may have no justifiable empirical basis. 
Objective #2: Case studies on bidding process of contractors 
Research design 
The main issues considered in formulating the research design were the nature of the 
question asked, the unit of analysis, validity of the research findings and how others 
have approached similar research problems. Most studies in construction management 
seem to be based on the routine questionnaire and interview surveys. Here, however, 
the unit of analysis was an entire tender process, i.e. from start (receipt of tender 
document at the office) to finish (when the bid was ready to submit). The research 
question was: how do contractors take account of risk when calculating their bids for 
construction work? In the first place, this required a comprehensive, intensive and 
inductive strategy for capturing pricing activities, observing what contractors do when 
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they put together a price, and learning about what features they take account of, 
including the extent to which they apportion risk and the mechanisms that they use for 
building up their contingencies. Clearly, the research required to find answers to these 
questions needed to be designed to capture what contractors do, rather than merely 
asking questions based on what the literature reports. 
The nature of the question asked required a method that gives a high degree of 
ecological validity of the research findings (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  Hence, a two-
stage research approach was formulated to help explore deeply into how contractors 
calculate prices for their bids for construction work, and how risk is taken into 
account.  The first stage of the research project was to carry out a preliminary 
investigation on some national contractors to gain an initial understanding of their 
actual bid-pricing practices; review queries developed during the literature review; 
and identify themes to help in formulating an appropriate research design for the 
second stage of the research project.  The first stage, which involved documentary 
analyses and in-depth interviews with five UK contractors, was reported in Laryea 
and Hughes (2008).  Therefore, here we focus on the second stage of the research 
project which was to observe examples of tender preparation in practice to see pricing 
strategies working at the operational level.  Due to a similarity in the nature of the 
question asked, the approach used for conducting this study was informed by the one 
used by Mintzberg (1973: 221-229) to investigate what managers actually do. 
Using participant observation, interview and documentary analysis, two live cases of 
the whole bidding process were shadowed in the offices of two of the top 20 UK civil 
engineering contractors (Hansford, 2008), hereafter referred to as Gamma and Delta. 
The time spent in Gamma and Delta doing participant observation was six and seven 
weeks respectively. In both cases, working hours was 0800-1730 hours (including 
one-hour of break time).  The tender period in Gamma started on 03 July 2008 and 
ended on 13 August 2008 instead of the originally stated 06 August. The reason was 
to allow bidders more time to incorporate changes introduced in the original tender 
documents.  In Delta, the tender period was 01 September to 17 October 2008 instead 
of the originally stated end date of 17 September. Here, the extension was caused by a 
change in the procurement method (i.e. from a design-build to build-only scheme) and 
changes in the original tender documents. 
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Clearly, bidding processes are unique and should be contextualized.  The average 
turnover of the firms is £543m, and their average workforce of 2466 people comprises 
of both office and site staff.  The case studies involved a close observation of every 
aspect of putting together a bid.  The project in Gamma comprised major 
infrastructure works proposed to enable a wide area of marsh land to be used for 
residential and commercial property development for a Local County Council in 
England.  This was to be executed as a Guaranteed Maximum Fixed Price (GMFP) 
contract.  The project in Delta comprised of proposed infrastructure works for a 
railway terminal in England comprising of platform works, a footbridge, track works, 
ole works and signaling works.  This was to be executed as a Fixed Price contract. 
Difficulties were experienced with negotiating access.  For example, the director in 
charge of estimating in one firm emailed the following response: “…I'm afraid that 
much of the detail we think you are likely to need will be too commercially sensitive 
for us to grant your request or release to you as this is effectively into the public 
domain.”  In short, access negotiation was difficult.  The firms that agreed mainly did 
so because of the importance and influence of the gatekeepers used to negotiate 
access, the academic purpose of the study, and the written assurances of 
confidentiality and anonymity in reporting the study. 
Engaging with the bid teams, and assisting them throughout the bidding process, 
helped to obtain a chronological record of basically everything involved in preparing 
a bid.  Data was collected using the researcher‟s own field notebook (see Appendix 2 
for a demonstration of how this was done); diaries given to some members of the bid 
team to fill in for each day‟s work; and voice recordings in some cases.  Apart from 
asking direct questions to clarify observations, several interviews were conducted 
with directors and others involved in the bidding process from an operational, market, 
and policy perspective.  Content analysis was used to interrogate the interview data, 
this was interpreted to support some of the theory developed from observations. 
The chronology record noted basic activities observed in the firms and their extent, as 
was done in the live observational study of five US chief executives, each over a one-
week period, by Mintzberg (1973: 235) between 1967-8.  Most observations here 
were quite straightforward to categorize and code, but a few were more difficult 
particularly because of their overlapping features.  Bidding activities were 
operationalized as: calculations (start to finish of all times spent on resourcing, 
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pricing, take off, etc); correspondence (start to finish of all times spent giving 
attention to incoming and outgoing post, email, phone calls); and conversations (start 
to finish of all times spent on unscheduled meetings, and informal discussions about 
the bid by the bid team members); documents (time spent studying tender 
documents); meeting (formal, scheduled discussions about the bid); deskwork 
(writing of letters, enquiries, tender notes, administrative work, queries, etc), travel 
(travel time to attend meetings such as site visit or client interview) and off (holidays 
or time off by a member of the bid team).  It was fairly straightforward to sort the data 
in the chronology record using MS Excel spreadsheet, code it according to the 
categories described, tally activity durations under each category, and then estimate 
each activity category as a proportion of the tender period (see Tables 1 and 2).  
Relevant documents used in the bidding process were also collected and analyzed for 
example, risk schedules, meeting agenda and minutes, and commercial review reports. 
Analysis of the chronology record of observations in Gamma and Delta 
The chronology record (analyzed in Tables 1 and 2) captured basic activities of the 
bidding processes at Gamma and Delta and their extent. 
Gamma case study 
<TABLE 1> NEARH HERE 
Table 1 shows that the greatest part of the tender period in Gamma was spent on 
deskwork activities (39%). This is followed in magnitude by off-days (20%), 
meetings (13%), calculations (12%), study of documents (7%), conversations (5%), 
correspondence (3%), and travel (2%) respectively.  Although the 6-week tender 
period was approximately 288 hours, the total combined work on the tender lasted 
307 hours, i.e. a difference of 19 hours. This shows some activity overlaps.  The 
analysis of the chronology record showed a total of 17 meetings lasting 41.32 hours, 
61 conversations lasting 15.7 hours, 38 different times of calculations lasting 36.32 
hours, 11 members if the bid team, at least 363 phone calls and 282 external incoming 
and outgoing emails, 90 tender query responses, 9 tender addenda, 6.39 hours of 
studying over 571 pages of drawings and specifications, 20 Gamma queries to 
consultants, 55 subcontract enquiries, and 22 supply enquiries. More than 50% of the 
90 TQ responses, which had major works scope implications, were received in the 
final two weeks of the tender process, which had to be extended because of these 
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changes.  Altogether, at least 313 major bidding activities were recorded and 
analyzed.  The bill of quantities contained 1053 items needed to be priced. The 
commercial review highlighted 105 clauses in the ICE conditions of contract 7
th
 
Edition that had been amended by the client.  Two estimators worked on the bid 78% 
and 22% of tender period respectively due to scheduling of holidays.  Subcontract 
quotations were received between 2-5 weeks.  Supply quotations were received 
relatively much earlier: 1-2 weeks.  The consultants took an average of four days to 
reply queries and most query responses introduced changes that affected the bid 
team‟s work.  Clearly, this sporadic nature of the bidding process hardly seems to 
model the kind of systematic or rational behaviour most analytical models assume. 
The main personnel involved in preparing the bid were: Bid Manager, Estimator and 
Planner. The Bid Manager coordinated all activities involved in putting together the 
tender submission, in the format required by the client.  He worked throughout the 
tender period.  Two estimators (EI and EII) worked on the bid mainly because of their 
availability resulting from annual holiday. EI worked 68% of the tender period (i.e. 
21/31 days). EII took over from EI from 2008-07-25 to 2008-08-11. Two of the days 
overlapped to enable a smooth estimating handover. Estimator II worked 22% of the 
tender period (7/31 days). No estimating duties were performed on 10% of the tender 
period, i.e. 3 days (28-30 July) because both estimators were on holiday. In the final 
three days, EI finished off the tender, having returned from his holiday.  Planners: 
three planners (PI, PII, and PIII) were involved in preparing the tender programme. 
The programme was put together in 71% of the tender period (22 days). PI worked for 
55% (17 days) of the tender period. PII and PIII worked for 13% (4 days) and 3% 
(one day) of the time respectively. No planning work was done on 21% of the tender 
period (9 days) because of holidays and work on other bids. 
Three major meetings were used to process the bid submission, i.e. „start-up‟, „mid-
tender review‟ and „final tender review‟ meetings.  A commercial analysis of the 
proposed conditions of contract was carried out by the Commercial Manager.  105 
amended clauses were described as „onerous‟ and thus requiring review by the client.  
One reason was to avoid pricing such risks to avoid inflating the tender price. Gamma 
also thought the client was in a better position to own those commercial risks because 
of their low probability, high impact nature.  Clear assumptions were also stated in 
areas where adequate specifications were not given for bill items in order to deal with 
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risk.  The main risks of concern were: commercial risk arising out of the proposed 
conditions of contract and risks associated with the ecological and archaeological 
works, programme and weather, and guaranteeing the price and quantities. A risk 
schedule was prepared and priced.  However, most risks were included in the bid as 
qualifications to the tender programme and price.  The description from EII (below) 
revealed two main types of unsystematic risk that may be priced in contractors‟ bids 
namely: „identified‟ and „residual‟ risk. 
“…If you can't do anything about a risk, that is the residual risk, that is often hard to quantify. Some of 
the risks you can do something to mitigate them - by providing a standby crane for example. These we 
call identified risks. So those ones, we actually price for them. The residual risk - you have to assess 
whether it is high, medium or low and whether or not that risk could happen, and the likely cost, the 
minimum cost, and the maximum cost. At the end of the day you come up with the cost of all the risks, 
and people will say „it's too much.‟ So you devise ways of mitigating those you can. One way is to 
qualify your tender depending on the client. Some will accept, and some won't…” 
 
Thus, identified risks will normally be included in a bid price and programme.  But 
any residual risk will be left to management, at the adjudication stage, to take a 
commercial view on the level of risk allowance that is appropriate to price in the bid. 
Here, a total allowance of £220,000 was priced initially for eight residual risks.  
However, the figure was reduced to £120,000 at the final tender review to enhance 
competitiveness. Thus, given a risk allowance of £120,000 for the £6.5m project, it 
implies a risk margin of 1.8% in the bid.  The tender period lasted for 31 days; it was 
25 days originally but was extended because of sev ral changes introduced. 
Delta case study 
<TABLE 2> NEARH HERE 
Table 2 shows that, here too, the greatest part of the tender period was spent on 
deskwork activities (25%). This is followed in magnitude by calculations (24%), 
study of documents (19%), meetings (15%), conversations (9%), off-days (4%), travel 
(1%), and correspondence (2%) respectively.  The chronology record showed that 
members of the bid team had to process approximately 273 incoming and outgoing 
phone calls, 124 internal and external emails, 958 bill items to be priced, 1090 pages 
of tender documents, 23 tender query responses, 2 tender addenda, 31 subcontract 
enquiries, and 14 supply enquiries.  The project was intended to be design-build 
initially but the client changed their mind in favor of a build-only arrangement.  The 
total combined hours of work on the bid was 363 hours.  Subcontract quotes were 
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received in an average of 16 days.  Supply quotes were received much earlier, i.e. in 
an average of 5 days.  Six major meetings took place.  These lasted a total of 54.43 
hours. 12 people made up the bid team including the Bid Manager, Estimator, 
Planner, commercial manager, project manager, ops support, tender administrator and 
enquiries, SQE, and quantities take off.  However, the main people involved, and their 
periods of engagement in the seven-week tender period are Bid Manager (97%), 
Estimator (86%), and Planner (94%) respectively.  The Bid Manager coordinated all 
activities involved in the tender process, studied and helped to understand the scope of 
works, and priced risks. The Planner produced the programme of works. The 
Estimator priced the bill of quantities using quotations received from the supply and 
subcontract enquiries. The required elements of the tender submission itself (price, 
quality, and programme) were put together by the BM with assistance from an 
administrative staff.  Here too, three major meetings used to process the bid 
submission were the „tender launch‟, „mid-tender review‟ and „final tender review‟ 
meetings. The tender process was originally scheduled to end in September but this 
was extended because of a change in the method of procurement and changes in the 
tender documents.  A commercial analysis of the proposed conditions of contract was 
carried out by the commercial department.  This identified 15 amended clauses as 
„risky‟ and requiring a review by the client. The main risks were identified as 
programme, design and the tight timescales available for delivering the project. In 
relation to these risks, a formal risk schedule was prepared and priced.   
Given the project value of £7.5m; and the „risk pot‟ of £120,850, it follows that risk 
margin in the bid was 1.6%.  However, this could be slightly higher in other cases.  A 
documentary analysis of previous tenders for 24 projects of value between £1.5 and 
£13.8m was carried out.  The data was captured from the „tender book‟ produced in 
the process of building up a price for each project. The analysis showed that 24 
projects with average value of £7.7m priced between 2005 and 2008 had an average 
risk allowance of 2% in the bids.  The conditions of contract for the 24 projects were 
similar. But given potentially different levels of competition involved in each case, 
this analysis may be viewed as an approximate estimate of risk apportionment in bids.  
Here too, the risk allowance seemed to cover „exceptional‟ risk, as explained below 
by the Technical Services Director based on his 23 years of experience. 
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 “…There is a certain amount of risk that is automatically priced in the bid, based on the documents 
given. This is a normal risk allowance.  However, the estimate often does not include an allowance for 
exceptional risk because they cannot be quantified and priced…” 
 
Thus, two types of internal risk may be priced in bids: „normal‟ risk (which is taken 
into account by estimators and planners) and „exceptional‟ risk (which directors will 
take a view on based on market and firm circumstances). Most of the commercial 
risks were taken into account using qualifications, assumptions, and clarifications in 
the tender programme and price.  Based on 25 years‟ experience, the Chief Executive 
of Delta classified proposed projects into good jobs (25%), normal jobs (50%) and 
risky jobs (25%).  He explained that generally, risk influences pricing levels by 1-3% 
in most normal jobs.  For risky jobs, risk could be up to 7.5%, and it could be 0% in 
good jobs where potential opportunities often balance out the risk. 
Risk accountability in bids (Tier 1-3) 
The close observation, interviews and documentary analyses of the work of 
contractors revealed that there may be three tiers of risk apportionment in a bid.  The 
first level of risk apportionment in a bid (Tier 1) occurs at the individual level of the 
estimator (and programme planner).  When estimators are calculating quantities and 
unit rates, they subjectively compensate for inaccuracies and errors, using experience 
and gut-feel, by adjusting the estimate until an intuitive satisfaction is felt about its 
adequacy (see Smith and Bohn, 1999: 106 where the authors explained that “In reality 
contractors tend to „buffer‟ their bids when they feel uncertain about the cost of an 
individual item”).  Here, the risk apportionment may depend on the experience and 
skill of the estimator (and planner).  Sometimes, the risk component may be included 
so smoothly that even the estimator does not realize it is being included.  The second 
level of risk apportionment in a bid (Tier 2) occurs at the level of the bid team where 
they think through the actual construction phase of the project and include a price for 
any identified or operational risks.  Here, the risk apportionment may depend on the 
level of expertise in the contractor‟s estimating department.  The third level of risk 
apportionment in a bid (Tier 3) occurs at the final stage of the tender process where a 
firm‟s management ultimately decides on the allocation of a residual risk allowance in 
a bid, sometimes based on a risk value calculated with the help of a risk register and 
probability-impact matrix.  Here, they take into account market conditions and firm‟s 
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particular circumstances and the risk apportionment may depend on the experience of 
a firm‟s management and their attitude towards risk. 
Objective #3: Comparison of theory and practice 
Five points are discussed.  First, on the comparison of analytical risk models with 
what contractors actually do, it was found that most models prescribe the addition of a 
contingency allowance in bids for risk, based on a calculated risk value (see for 
example, Tah et al. 1993; and Zeng et al. 2007).  However, particularly in competitive 
markets and recessionary periods, contractors often cannot afford to price risk mainly 
because of the fear of losing work (Smith and Bohn, 1999: 107).  Here, both Gamma 
and Delta tried to use clever strategies and tactics in their bid proposals to insure 
against commercial and operational risks.  In fact, both contractors carried out a 
commercial analysis of the proposed conditions of contract and decided on the best 
way to approach risks: either to avoid bidding at all or to qualify (or clarify) the 
commercial risks as part of the tender submission for post-tender negotiations.  In 
relation to operational risks, both contractors stated clear assumptions upon which 
their offer (tender programme and price) was based.  Therefor , analytical models 
prescribe contingency allocation whereas contractors here managed risk mostly 
through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. 
Second, the main bidding activities of contractors were categorized and their extent 
estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), study of tender 
documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and 
travel (1%).  This approximation was based on the average of two chronology records 
analyzed from 670 hours of direct participant observation in Gamma and Delta (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Table 3 shows details of the main bid preparation activities observed 
in Gamma and Delta and three stages of the whole bidding process of contractors. 
 
<TABLE 3> NEAR HERE 
 
The estimating activities did not appear to follow the typical S-curve behaviour 
illustrated in The PMBOK Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge.  
Here, the pattern of estimators‟ activity was loaded at the beginning (with the tender 
documents being studied to gain an understanding of the scope of works in order to 
prepare supply and subcontract quotes and price the job well), slowed in the middle 
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(with quotations awaited), and loaded towards the end (with quotations in, addenda, 
query responses, meetings, and submission time nearing). The typical S-curve 
behaviour is described as follows (Cioffi, 2005): 
 “When displayed as a function of time, accumulated efforts or costs of a project usually takes a form 
described as the S-curve (flatter at the beginning and end, steeper in the middle). The classic S-curve is 
described as having three parts: a gentle rise, a steep slope, and a gradual path to the asymptote”. 
However, the pattern of basic activity here appeared steeper at the beginning and end 
and flatter in the middle. Hence, bidding activities of estimators (see Table 3) may not 
model the typical S-curve behaviour.  An examination of the chronology records from 
Gamma and Delta showed that although the two tender processes related to projects 
that were different in nature, the basic activities performed by the bid teams were 
significantly similar. This showed that bidding practices may be dictated by company 
practices and not project variables; this should be investigated further. 
Third, the risk and price relationship of 0-3% expressed in most parts of the literature 
for example, Neufville and King (1991) and Smith and Bohn (1999) was clearly 
confirmed in Gamma and Delta (1.6% and 1.8% respectively).  The analysis of past 
tenders in Delta showed that an average of 2% risk margin was included in 24 bids of 
average value £7.7m priced between 2005 and 2008.  This risk allowance seemed to 
cover mainly the residual risk (Tier 3) of the projects.  It did not seem to include 
allowances for identified risks (Tier 2) and intuitive risk allowances included by the 
estimator to compensate for estimating inaccuracies and errors in the estimates (Tier 
1).  Therefore, prior to apportionment of 1-2% residual risk allowance in some bids by 
management, identified and intuitive risk allowances may be included in a bid by 
estimators and planners.  Hence, it appeared that the 5-10% margin that textbooks 
suggest as risk allowance in contractor bids may ring true in this context. 
Fourth, the findings show how risk is priced mostly through contractual rather than 
price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives at the time of bidding.  
Contractors were concerned about the risk of getting the tender price wrong.  Hence, 
mechanisms used to deal with risk included a commercial review of the conditions of 
contract; commercial and planning review sessions by the bid team; and the use of 
assumptions, qualifications and clarifications in the tender programme and price.  
Two main risks of concern were commercial and operational risk.  Depending on the 
degree to which the proposed contract conditions were considered „onerous‟, the bid 
teams decided on the best way to approach risks, i.e. either to avoid bidding at all, or 
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qualify (or clarify) the risks as part of the tender submission for post-tender 
negotiations with the client. Operational risk related to the perceived difficulty in 
carrying out the actual job under physical conditions such as access, location and 
ground.  In relation to these, the contractors stated clear assumptions upon which their 
offer was based.  Thus, it became clear that instead of pricing in risk allowances that 
will inflate the bid price, and probably cause them to be uncompetitive, strategies and 
tactics were devised to help offer the best (lowest) price for „getting a foot in the door‟ 
or „getting to the table‟ to negotiate risks with the client at the post-tender stage.  This 
was found to be one reason why contractors may not approach risks according to the 
contingency allocation theory proposed in most analytical risk modeling approaches. 
Fifth, risk premiums are often decided by a firm‟s directors based on the confidence 
perceived in the explanations of the bid team‟s work.  There was significant 
difference in the way the two main stages of the tender process (estimating stage and 
adjudication stage) are approached.  This was clarified by one of the chief executives: 
“The estimating process involves a lot of rational steps, in terms of the way you build 
up the price.  But when it comes to settling the tender, that process is more of a gut-
feel or art to know the right prices. Gut-feel is your instincts – is the job right, priced 
properly? You judge the confidence in the guys who priced it and the way they 
display it when they come to settle the bid”. Thus, as some directors described it, the 
process that they use to pitch the final tender price, to make it respond well to buyers 
in the construction market, is intuitive, unsystematic, and a skill that they gain from 
experience. Hence, establishing the right balance between the related concepts of cost, 
price and value in bidding is an important commercial exercise for a firm‟s directors.  
It is not just a technical exercise. Four main factors considered were commercial risks; 
operational risks; competition; and desire to win the work.  If the directors feel 
confident of the bid team‟s work, and want to win a job, they may price for some of 
the residual risk and assume the rest, which they would hope to manage through 
opportunities in the construction phase.  However, when a job is needed, they may 
compromise to win it by assuming the residual risk and pricing a lower margin. 
Conclusions 
Three main conclusions are drawn.  First, formal and analytical risk models prescribe 
how risk should be incorporated in construction bids.  However, a review of 60+ 
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propositions showed that most of them are analytically derived and not informed by 
any major empirical research on what contractors actually do in practice.  No 
comprehensive study that captures the whole bid-pricing process of contractors; 
describes how risk is taken into account throughout the bid-pricing process; and 
shows that pricing is indeed systematic in nature was found.  To this end, systematic 
propositions for contractors were considered to have no justifiable empirical basis.  
Most models prescribe contingency allocation in bids. However, in practice, 
contractors tend to approach risk more circumspectly than the models prescribe 
because of a set of complex, microeconomic factors like the scope of works, forward 
workload, need-for-work, competition and other exigencies of bidding practice that 
also affect price. Thus, the contingency allocation theory underpinning most 
analytical risk models may not be sustainable in practice. 
Second, in order to compare the theoretical risk analysis models with the practice of 
risk analysis, access was negotiated and the whole te der process was shadowed in 
the offices of two of the top 20 UK civil engineering contractors.  The aim here was to 
explore deeply rather than superficially into what contractors actually do.  Hence, the 
participant observation method used, although exhausting in nature, helped to achieve 
a high degree of ecological validity of the research findings. Three stages of the 
bidding process were found and bidding activities were categorized and their extent 
estimated.  The bidding process did not seem to follow any systematic pattern; its 
activities depended on the prevailing daily circumstances of the bid team. The 
difficulty in achieving a programmable bidding process was caused by changes to the 
tender documents, poor quality of tender documents, personnel problems and reliance 
on the supply chain for information to price the bid. Thus, assumptions of systematic 
behaviour in bidding practice does not ring true in this context. 
Third, three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified (Tier 1-3).  Tier 1: 
intuitive risk allowances included in the tender programme and price by estimators 
and planners to compensate for inaccuracies and errors in estimates; Tier 2: bid teams 
tend to include an allowance in the bid for the identified risks in a project; and Tier 3: 
a firm‟s management decides on the appropriate level of residual risk allowance to 
include in a bid.  Thus, different individuals and teams influence pricing levels at 
different stages of the bid calculation process. Sometimes, priced risks may be 
excluded from a bid to enhance the chances of winning a job.  The tender adjustments 
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for risk may take considerable time to decide but the actual arithmetic involved in 
reducing or increasing the final price tends to be simpler than the sophisticated 
prescription of analytical models. Thus, analytical models may be too time-
consuming, too complex and insensitive to the commercial exigencies of bidding 
practice. Clearly, risk is an important factor in the bid calculation process of 
contractors, which often takes place in a short time frame and competitive market 
environment. Perhaps, a simple table of risk factors, which could be for example, 
location/project-specific, which indicates a scale or factor by which contractors could 
easily and flexibly adjust an estimate for risk may be handier and even appropriate. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 Empirical studies in journals on how contractors price their work 
Authors Year Journal Vol. Issue Pages Aspect(s) of 
bid pricing 
Research 
method 
Data 
points 
Country 
Uher 1991 CME 9 6 495-508 Risks Q. Survey 47 Australia 
Neufville and 
King 
1991 JCME 117 4 659-673 Risk and 
need for 
work 
Experiment 
and interview 
30 US 
Mak and 
Raftery 
1992 CME 10 4 303-320 Errors Experiment 62 UK 
Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi 
1992 CME 10 5 415-429 Markup Q. Survey 71 Saudi 
Arabia 
Shash 1993 CME 11 2 111-118 tendering / 
markup 
Q. Survey 85 UK 
Kodikara et al. 1993 CME 11 4 261-269 BQ Interview 8 Sri Lanka 
Kodikara and 
McCaffer 
1993 CME 11 5 341-346 Estimating 
data 
Interview 10 Sri Lanka 
Tah et al. 1994 CME 12 1 31-36 Indirect 
costs 
Q. & I. Survey 7 UK 
Skitmore and 
Wilcock 
1994 CME 12 2 139-154 Item pricing Q. Survey 8 UK 
Edwards and 
Edwards 
1995 CME 13 6 485-491 Services Documents 15 Australia 
Ming et al. 1996 CME 14 3 253-264 Profit  Documents 221 Australia 
Uher 1996 ECAM 3 1/2 83-95 Estimating 
practices 
Q. & I. Survey 10 Australia 
Shash and Al-
Amir 
1997 CME 15 2 187-200 Processing, 
use of IT 
Q. Survey 93 Saudi 
Arabia 
Bajaj et al. 1997 CME 15 4 363-369 Risks Q Survey 19 Australia 
Shash 1998 CME 124 3 219-225 Bidding 
practices 
Q. Survey 30 US 
Shash 1998 JCEM 124 2 101-106 Pricing 
decisions 
Q. Survey 30 US 
Ray et al. 1999 CME 17 2 139-153 Ethics Q. Survey 60 Australia 
Smith & Bohn 1999 JCEM 125 2 101-108 Risks Interview 12 US 
Akintoye 2000 CME 18 1 77-89 Estimating Survey 84 UK 
Akintoye and 
Fitzgerald 
2000 CME 18 2 161-172 Cost 
estimating 
Q. Survey 84 UK 
Mochtar and 
Arditi 
2001 CME 19 4 405-415 Pricing 
strategy 
Survey 400 US 
Asaaf et al. 2001 IJPM 19 5 295-303 Risks Q. Survey 38 Hong Kong 
Wong and Hui 2006 CME 24 4 425-438 Risks Q. Survey 38 Hong Kong 
Chan and Au 2007 IJPM 25 6 615-626 Weather 
risks 
Q. Survey 60 Hong Kong 
Notes: CME: Construction Management and Economics; IJPM: International Journal of Project 
Management; JCEM: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management; ECAM: Engineering, 
Construction and Architectural Management; BQ: Bill of Quantities 
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Appendix 2 Chronology record of one estimator’s work on D30: 2008-08-12 
Ref Time Code Activity description Location 
30A 0800-
0933 
DW Estimator goes through all the tender adds/omits arising 
from final tender review meeting 
Estimator’s 
office 
30B 0933-
1100 
CA Estimator making adjustments from review meeting and 
late issued amendments from client 
Area office 
30C 1101 CE Estimator reads TQ 82 response just received in relation to 
Commitments register, and a further response to TQ20 re 
rail possession dates 
Area office 
30C 1101-
1107 
D Estimator reads through quickly to determine whether 
prices will be affected or qualified. 
Estimator’s 
office 
30D 1108-
1149 
CN Estimator discusses programme revisions with planner to 
understand how it affects prices. 
Estimator’s 
office 
30E 1150-
1206 
CN Bid manager, estimator, and tender manager discuss the 
changes being made in the tender figures. Estimator: "The 
job itself is a simple straightforward job but it’s been made 
complicated by all these ecological and archaeological 
works and how the tender process has been handled." BM: 
"I think whoever wins it will depend on the amount of 
qualifications in the tender" 
Bid 
manager's 
office 
30F 1206-
1402 
CN Estimator back in his office. Cross-checking and 
transferring directs bill of quantities to excel 
Estimator’s 
office 
30G 1403-
1613 
CA Cross-checking and transferring indirects bill of quantities 
to excel 
Estimator’s 
office 
30H 1613-
1630 
CN Estimator phones drainage subcontractor to notify him of 
some new changes and find out whether his prices change 
as a result. Drainage subcontractor informs him that he 
learned about it from one of the other tenderers but 
quotation is still fine to use 
Estimator’s 
office 
30J 1630-
1715 
CA Calculating savings for use of alternative materials Estimator’s 
office 
30K 1715-
1800 
DW Final check on documents and file/number ready for 
printing out. Shuts down computer 
Estimator’s 
office 
Notes on activity codes and categories: DW: Deskwork; CA: Calculations; CE: Correspondence; D: 
Documents; CN: Conversations 
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Table 1 Analysis of the chronology record of activity observations in Gamma 
Activities Calc. Conv. Corr. Deskwork Docs. Mtg. Off Travel Total 
Time (hours) 36.32 15.7 7.9 120.12 20.6 41.32 60.03 4.92 306.91 
Percent (%) 11.83 5.12 2.57 39.14 6.71 13.46 19.56 1.60 100% 
Notes on activity categories: Calc - calculations; Conv - conversations; Corr - correspondence; 
Docs - study of documents; Mtg - meeting times; Off - holidays and time off by employees. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Analysis of the chronology record of observations in Delta 
Activities Calc. Conv. Corr. Deskwork Docs. Mtg. Off Travel Total 
Time (hrs) 88.42 33.50 8.55 91.97 68.88 54.43 15.25 2.38 363.38 
Percent (%) 24.33 9.22 2.35 25.31 18.96 14.98 4.20 0.66 100% 
Notes on activity categories: Calc - calculations; Conv - conversations; Corr - correspondence; 
Docs - study of documents; Mtg - meeting times; Off - holidays and time off by employees. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Bidding process stages and activities 
INITIAL STAGE  MIDDLE STAGE  FINAL STAGE 
Receipt of tender documents Subcontract and supply work 
packages enquiries 
(identification and dispatch)  
Updating of bill prices from quotations 
Logging in of new tender information 
(approximate value – determines the team 
size) 
Resourcing and pricing of bill 
items (with allowances for risk 
included in estimates) 
Final tender review – commercial and 
planning/programme (risk may be included 
in final tender programme and price, then 
qualifications – what the price is based on. 
Programme – weather risk, LAD risk, 
possessions, sectional completion dates) 
Appointment of tender team Mid-term client meeting for 
clarifications 
Tender adjustments (adds/omits) 
Preliminary study of tender documents and 
checking of documents received 
Mid-term tender review (review 
of draft programme, pricing 
strategy, risk and opportunity) 
Submission of tender programme and price 
(including qualifications, clarifications, and 
tenderer’s assumptions for post tender 
discussions if tender price is ‘of interest’ to 
client) 
Tender launch meeting (assignment of roles 
and responsibilities, risks analysis – 
programme risk, bid/no-bid conditions – 
interim and final review meetings, tender 
preparation programme, pricing strategy) 
Bid / no-bid decision 
Detailed study of tender documentation Pricing of indirect costs 
Commercial review Pricing of fixed costs 
Site visit Risk meeting and pricing of the 
risk schedule led by bid 
manager 
Preliminary programme to assess the risk 
and feasibility of the client’s programme 
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